

China Blast at Russia Is a Lulu

By Drew Pearson

The American Embassy in Moscow has now obtained the full text of China's big blast against Soviet Russia, and it's a lulu. It puts in the shade anything Harry Truman ever said about me.

Harry, of course, was succinct and to the point. The Chinese are verbose and repetitious. They take 30,000 words to say what Harry Truman said in three letters.

But it all adds up to the same thing, namely that the Russians are "double-faced," "cunning," "hyprocritical," "have shamelessly emasculated Lenin's theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat," all because the new leaders of the Kremlin "have been busy running errands for the U.S. aggressors," and because "the new leaders have revealed in all its ugliness their support of the aggressor and their alliance with the United States."

"We absolutely refuse to serve as a pawn in their secret diplomacy with U.S. imperialism or help them cover up their assistance to U.S. imperialism," exploded the Chinese editorial blast.

The Chinese even accused their Russian comrades of table-pounding at the United Nations. "They repeat Khrushchev's despicable stock tricks at the meetings of these international organizations, rely on behind-the-scenes manipulation, as well as open trouble-making and even resort to such ludicrous tactics as banging tables and stamping their feet."

So runs the line of Chinese invective against their supposed partners in the world of Marx and Lenin.

LBJ's Weak Spot

The diatribe focuses attention on what is probably the weakest spot in the Johnson foreign policy. For at a time when Russian-Chinese relations are sour, American-Russian cooperation should be good. But the opposite is true.

Simultaneous with the Chinese barrage, Russia was sentencing to 18 months' labor an American tourist who had strayed across the border, ousting the correspondent of The Washington Post, questioning renewal of the Soviet-American cultural agreement, and putting Red army marshals in new positions of power.

There are three reasons for this hardening of Soviet policy toward the United States:

1.—There has always been an anti-American clique inside the Kremlin, and United States operations in Vietnam have strengthened it.

2.—Some anti-Americanism is aimed at disproving the Chinese accusation that Moscow is the lackey of Washington.

3.—Most basic, however, is

the Johnson Administration's failure to realize the tremendous changes that have occurred in Russia and take advantage of them.

Twenty years ago Franklin Roosevelt argued that Russia was sure to change, that moderation would replace extremism, that tough communism would give way to a socialism similar to that of the British Labor Party, and that the peace of the world depended on U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. cooperation.

Reversing Roosevelt

But as the war ended Roosevelt died. Harry Hopkins, who agreed with him, died shortly thereafter. Henry Wallace resigned from the Truman Administration over this issue of Russian cooperation. And American foreign policy fell into the hands of the hard-nosed clique which believed war with Russia inevitable; and that we must rebuild the old Nazi cartels as a buffer against Russia.

Many of those who worked to rebuild Germany represented the U.S. bankers who had invested so heavily in Hitler's Germany—James Forrestal of Dillon, Read who became Secretary of Defense, William Draper of Dillon, Read who was Under Secretary of the Army, John J. McCloy of the Chase Bank who became High Commissioner to Germany, and John Foster Dulles, attorney for various pro-German New York banks, who became Secretary of State.

It was Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had worked with Red army leaders during the war who finally, and with some timidity, began to reverse the anti-Russian policy by inviting Khrushchev to Washington.

John F. Kennedy, after much hesitation and some false starts, continued the thaw with his American University speech and his test-ban treaty.

And Mr. Johnson, during his first year in office, made various conciliatory moves toward better Russian-American understanding.

However, Mr. Johnson, a superb leader on the domestic front, came to office with no background in foreign affairs. Though he bettered FDR's leadership on domestic problems he lacked FDR's long-range foresight that the Soviet would turn from extremism to moderation. He did not understand the continuing debate between the pro-German faction in Washington and Wall Street and the faction which believed that peace can be insured only by cooperation between the world's two most powerful nations—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

That's how Mr. Johnson accepted military advice in Vietnam, thereby drifting into a dead end from whence he looks helplessly at the bitter debate, between China and Russia without being able to take advantage of it. Historians will probably record this as his greatest mistake.

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